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ABSTRACT
Background. Being highly contagious by person-to-person transmission, varicella can easily spread
within the multinational population of a cruise ship and into communities ashore. The aim of the
study was to report the prevalence of varicella infections in a fleet of cruise ships during a two-
year period and to discuss measures to prevent and contain shipboard outbreaks.
Material  and methods. All probable varicella cases among passengers and crew on 34 cruise
ships were registered for 2 years by the medical facilities onboard. Patients remained isolated
until 6 days after rash onset. Susceptible contacts were identified and offered post-exposure
prophylaxis. Crew nationality, number of vaccinated contacts, and direct vaccination costs were
registered.
Resul ts . During two years 187 varicella cases (36 passengers, 151 crew) were registered and
2,685 varicella vaccinations were administered at an estimated direct vaccination cost of US $
283,832. Of the 34 ships, only 3 reported no cases of varicella. There were 8 clusters (‘out-
breaks’) of ≥ 5 varicella cases presenting less than 42 days apart, comprising a total of 89
patients. While > 130 nations were represented among the crew, the 151 crew cases came from
26 countries, and 88 (58%) of them came from 5 sub-tropical/tropical countries.
Conclusions. All cruise vessels must expect to encounter varicella cases or outbreaks onboard
every few years. Every varicella case can start an outbreak and thus trigger several time-consum-
ing and expensive containment measures, including isolation and mass vaccination of suscepti-
ble contacts. Mandatory pre-contract evidence of varicella immunity from all seafarers or from
subgroups according to position or nationality might be worth considering. Seafarers known to
be immune to varicella should always carry valid documentation while traveling.
(Int Marit Health 2011; 62, 4: 254–261)
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INTRODUCTION
Varicella (chickenpox) is a mostly mild and self-lim-
iting acute viral illness with worldwide distribution. Adults
may have more severe disease and have a higher inci-
dence of complications. Varicella may have serious con-
sequences in pregnant women and in immuno-com-
promised persons [1]. Being highly contagious by per-
son-to-person transmission and spreading quickly
throughout enclosed environments, varicella is parti-
cularly worrisome on cruise ships because the recom-
mended control measures, including patient isolation,
may influence safety and service aboard by reducing
the work force and keeping key personnel off duty. Crew
and passengers come from all over the world, and port
health authorities are concerned about varicella from
ships spreading into communities ashore.
Our aim is to report varicella in a fleet of cruise
ships during a two-year period and to describe and dis-
cuss measures to prevent and contain future shipboard
outbreaks.
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MATERIAL AND METHODS
The study comprised passengers and crew on
a fleet of cruise ships involving three separate corpo-
rate brands under one corporate owner and one
medical department. The fleet increased ranging from
30 to 34 ships during the study period. The ships
sailed mostly 7-day cruises (range: 2–25 days) all over
the world. Total passenger capacity ranged from 694
to 6,300 per ship. The complement of crew ranged
from 400 to 2,160 per ship. The multinational crew
served contracts onboard from 3 to 9 months. Most
crew below officer rank shared a cabin.
The medical facilities on all the ships offered reg-
ular consultation hours twice per day for passengers
and crew, as well as medical emergency service
around the clock (24/7). The medical staff on each
vessel included 1–3 physicians and 2–5 nurses,
depending on ship size.
All probable varicella cases among passengers
and crew reported to the ship medical facilities in
2009 and 2010 were registered and followed up by
the medical teams onboard and by the corporate
medical department. The diagnosis was clinical; se-
rological testing was not performed. The study was
part of a corporate quality assurance program, and,
to ensure confidentiality of protected health infor-
mation, most patient data, with the exception of crew
nationality, were not made available for evaluation.
Although the number of crew onboard remained
relatively constant (approximately 35,000 crew mem-
bers at the close of 2010), the number of different
seafarers working on these ships during the two years
was higher owing to factors such as vacation, end of
contract, and new hires. Crew nationality statistics
were therefore based on the company’s updated
August 2011 crew list, comprising 53,258 seagoing
employees from 134 nations. The 8 largest crew
groups came from the Philippines (21.4%), India
(12.7%), Indonesia (7.6%), Jamaica (6.0%), the USA
(4.2%), the United Kingdom (3.1%), Romania (2.6%),
and St. Vincent (2.5%).
The number of vaccinated contacts and direct
vaccination costs were registered for each ship.
A ship was considered ‘varicella-free’ if more than
42 days (2 incubation periods) had passed since the
last symptomatic patient.
VARICELLA DEFINITIONS [2]:
— Case classification: a) Probable — A case that
meets the clinical definition, is not laboratory con-
firmed, and not epidemiologically linked to anoth-
er probable or confirmed case. b) Confirmed
— A case that is laboratory confirmed or a case that
meets the clinical case definition and is epidemio-
logically linked to a confirmed or a probable case.
— Case contact: A persons with ≥ 5 minutes of
direct face-to-face contact with a confirmed vari-
cella case during the infectious period.
— Clinical case definition: An illness of diffuse
(generalized) maculo-papulo-vesicular rash with-
out other apparent cause.
— Incubation period: The period between virus
exposure and onset of rash: Average 14–16 days,
with a range of 10–21 days.
— Index case: The first person with varicella identi-
fied in a chain of transmission.
— Infectious period: Virus shedding period: From
2 days before rash onset until all lesions are crus-
ted over or until no new lesions appear within
a 24-hour period (average range: 4–7 days).
— ‘Evidence of immunity to varicella’ includes:
a) Written documentation of receipt of two doses
of varicella-containing vaccine; o r b) Serologic
evidence of immunity or confirmed disease; o r
c) Birth in the United States before 1980; o r
d) A diagnosis or history of varicella or herpes
zoster verified by a health-care provider or by the
cruise ship clinician based on the patient’s de-
scription of the illness.
— High-risk person/contact: Someone at in-
creased risk for complications from varicella be-
cause of age or an underlying condition (e.g.,
immuno-compromised person, cancer patients,
pregnant women, neonates whose mothers are
not immune).
— Outbreak: The occurrence of ≥ 5 varicella cas-
es that are related in place and epidemiologically
linked.
PROTOCOL FOR VARICELLA MANAGEMENT
ABOARD
Table 1 shows outbreak containment measures
implemented when three in a 24-hour period or four
or more varicella cases in a single incubation period
occurred on a cruise ship during the study, based
on guidance from The U.S. Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) [1]. Further details from
the instructions sent by the medical department of
the fleet to the vessels:
— Case finding: Conduct a review of all crew and
passenger medical logs for the previous 42 days
in search of cases of rash illness suggestive of
varicella whenever a probable varicella case is
reported.
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— Case management: Isolate all cases in their ca-
bins using standard, contact, and airborne pre-
cautions until all lesions have crusted or 6 days
have elapsed since rash onset. Crew patients may
return to work after 6 days have elapsed since
rash onset. Crew members needing to be in con-
tact with passengers or crew under isolation must
supply evidence of immunity to varicella.
— Identification of contacts: Identify all contacts
of each case, including intimate partners, cabin
mates, bathroom mates, dining mates, work mates,
social contacts, and any other person with whom
the case had direct contact during the case’s
infectious period. Assess all contacts for signs of
varicella and for evidence of immunity to varicel-
la, and identify high-risk contacts. Ask all contacts
to report fever or rash to the shipboard medical
facility immediately.
— Post-exposure prophylaxis of contacts: Provide
a first dose of varicella vaccine to all susceptible
contacts (except high-risk persons) within 3–5
days of exposure. Give a second dose at least
4 weeks later to adults. Evaluate high-risk contacts
for administration of varicella zoster immune glob-
ulin within 96 hours of exposure.
— Surveillance and management of contacts:
Susceptible crew members who received the first
dose of varicella vaccine may return to work im-
mediately after vaccination but are placed under
active surveillance and monitored daily for symp-
toms of varicella for up to 21 days after their last
exposure to an active varicella case. Susceptible
crew members who do not receive varicella vac-
cine should, from the 8th through the 21st day
after last exposure to the case, have no passen-
ger contact, minimal contact with other crew
members, and be placed under active surveil-
lance for symptoms of varicella. Only persons who
are immune to varicella are permitted to have
contact with susceptible, exposed crew members,
and the amount of contact with other crew mem-
bers should be limited. Anyone with a new fever
should be isolated and monitored for 2 days for
the onset of rash. If a rash develops, then conti-
nue isolation as for an active varicella case. If
a rash does not develop within 2 days of fever
onset, the crew member may be released from
isolation but instructed to minimize contact with
others, while active surveillance is continued until
a total of 21 days has elapsed since exposure.
Conduct passive surveillance aboard the ship until
27 days after the rash onset date of the last case
by monitoring patient visits for rash illnesses sug-
gestive of varicella.
— Crew transfer cancellation: Whenever an out-
break of varicella is declared, transfer of crew
without evidence of immunity to other vessels
must be immediately cancelled for a period that
extends for two incubation periods (42 days) af-
ter the last reported case.
— Reporting: All clinical varicella cases must be
reported immediately to the medical department
at corporate headquarters and to local port au-
thorities in every port according to International
Health Regulations 2005 (‘Maritime Declaration
of Health’) [3] and to national law. Ships destined
for a U.S. port of entry from a foreign country or
possession must report varicella cases to the CDC
Quarantine Station at or nearest to the next in-
tended U.S. port of arrival [4] and act according
Table 1. Outbreak containment measures implemented when three in a 24-hour period or four or more varicella cases in a single
incubation period occurred on a cruise ship
• Report cases to port health authorities and company headquarters
• Isolate the case(s) until 6 days after rash onset
• Ensure that only immune crew members care for isolated persons
• Conduct an all-crew survey to determine the number of susceptible individuals
• Identify high-risk persons to provide proper post-exposure prophylaxis
• Acquire a sufficient number of vaccines through company headquarters
• Identify and vaccinate susceptible contacts among passengers and crew
• Notify onboard and embarking passengers and port visitors about the exposure risk
• Arrange for pre-sea vaccination of crew scheduled to join the ship
• Cancel transfer of non-immune crew to other vessels for 42 days after the last reported case
• Implement active daily surveillance for symptoms among the crew for 21 days after the last case
• Isolate all crew with fever within 21 days after the last case and observe for rash onset for the next 2 days
• Monitor clinic visits for rashes (passive surveillance) for 21 days after the last case
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to the CDC’s Guidance for Cruise Ships on the
Management of Varicella (Chickenpox) [1].
RESULTS
During the two-year study period 187 varicella
cases (151 crew, 36 passengers) were registered and
2,685 varicella vaccinations were administered at an
estimated direct vaccination cost of US $ 283,832
(Table 2). No contacts received varicella zoster im-
mune globulin. Of the 34 ships, only 3 reported zero
cases of varicella, 5 ships reported zero crew cases,
while 19 reported zero passenger cases. There were
8 clusters of 5 or more varicella cases presenting
less than 42 days apart from each other, comprising
a total of 89 patients (Table 3): Three clusters in 2009
(29, 8, and 6 patients, respectively) and five in 2010
(14, 13, 7, 6, and 6 patients, respectively). Two of
these 8 clusters occurred on one ship (Ship C); one
in 2009 and one in 2010, and they were more than
6 months apart.
Details from 4 clusters:
— Cluster 1 (Ship A). The largest outbreak in 2009
comprised 29 crew cases on a ship with a com-
plement of 860 employees. All presented within
15 days and there were no further cases during
the following 42 days.
— Cluster 2 (Ship D) . The largest outbreak in 2010
comprised 13 patients (10 crew) on a ship with
2400 employees. All presented within 35 days with
16 days being the largest interval between pa-
tients (between the 1st and 2nd crew patient).
— Cluster 3 (Ship E). The epidemiological linking
within a second apparently large outbreak in
2010 was more uncertain (Figure 1): It comprised
possibly 11 patients (9 crew) over a period of
4.5 months, but perhaps only 6 crew patients
over a 25-day period were interconnected: Five
days after the first crew case presented, a pas-
senger presented with typical symptoms. Twenty-
-seven days later (> 1 incubation period)
a second crew case presented, followed 5 days
later by a third crew case. After 49 more days
(> 2 incubation periods) a 4th crew presented,
and during the next 25 days another 5 crew
members presented with symptoms, followed
by a passenger 28 days after the last (9th) crew
case. There were no further cases for the next
6 months.
Table 2. Number of varicella patients among crew and passengers, number of contact vaccinations given, and direct vaccina-
tion costs on a fleet of 34 cruise ships during a two-year period
Year Varicella cases Vaccinations Vaccination costs (US$)
Crew Passengers Total
2009 8 2 7 8 9 762 $ 107,105
2010 6 9 2 9 9 8 1,923 $ 176,727
Total 151 3 6 187 2,685 $ 283,832
Table 3. Number of varicella patients among crew and passengers and number of contact vaccinations given during 8 outbreaks
on 7 cruise ships within a two-year period
Outbreak definition: ≥ 5 possibly interconnected cases
Ships w/outbreaks Year Crew Passengers Total Vaccinations
Ship A 2009 2 9 0 2 9 400
Ship B 2009 6 2 8 157
Ship C 2009 5 1 6 3 4
Ship A+B+C 2009 4 0 3 4 3 591
Ship D 2010 1 1 3 1 4 565
Ship E 2010 1 0 3 1 3 447
Ship C 2010 6 1 7 223
Ship F 2010 6 0 6 270
Ship G 2010 6 0 6 118
Ship D+E+C+F+G 2010 3 9 7 4 6 1,623
All 8 outbreaks 2009+2010 7 9 1 0 8 9 2,214
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— Cluster 4 (Ship F). Similar to Cluster 3, there was
a gap of 27 days between the 4th and the 5th pa-
tients in a cluster of 6 crew patients during a 68-
-day period in 2010.
During the two-year-period 151 crew members
from 26 nations presented with symptoms of varicel-
la. Fifty-eight per cent (88 cases) came from 5 coun-
tries: The Philippines, Jamaica, Indonesia, India, and
St. Vincent & the Grenadines (Table 4).
DISCUSSION
Varicella is highly contagious by person-to-per-
son transmission. Once a case has occurred in
a susceptible population, it is very hard to prevent an
outbreak; secondary attack rates among suscepti-
ble household contacts may reach 85–90% [1]. On
cruise ships there is a high turnover of passengers
and crew from many countries, and the high popula-
tion density in a semi-closed environment facilitates
person-to-person spread [5]. The vessels’ rapid move-
ment between ports, with differences in sanitation
standards and exposure risks, can also introduce
sightseeing and embarking passengers and crew to
varicella.
Based on only a few available data per registered
varicella patient, the present study has many limita-
tions. Varying research experience and enthusiasm
among the ships’ medical team members as well as
Table 4. Number and percentage of varicella cases among 151 crew members from 26 countries during two years on a fleet of
34 cruise ships, according to nationality
Number of cases % of cases % of crew*
Philippines 24 1 6 21.4
Jamaica 24 1 6 6.0
Indonesia 1 5 1 0 7.6
India 1 3 8 12.7
St. Vincent 1 2 8 2.5
The 5 nations with most cases 8 8 5 8 50.2
USA 0 0 4.2
United Kingdom 2 1 3.1
*Percentage of crew from the various nations, according to company employee statistics 2011
Figure 1. Eleven varicella cases on a cruise ship during 4.5 months. The second and the eleventh patients were passengers. The
time intervals between the second and the third patient and between the tenth and the eleventh patient are longer than
1 incubation period, while the 49-day gap between the fourth and the fifth patient is longer than 2 incubation periods
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ship-to-shore communication challenges may have
resulted in underreporting of single cases, while it is
unlikely that patient clusters have not been regis-
tered. In total, 187 varicella cases were found, and
most of the ships had occasional varicella cases
among passengers and crew during the two years.
Every one of the 187 diagnosed cases could become
an index case for another outbreak and was regard-
ed as such, but in only 8 instances 5 or more cases
seemed to be interconnected or ‘epidemiologically
linked’. These 8 outbreaks involved 89 (48%) of the
187 varicella cases and lead to 2,214 (82%) of 2,685
contact vaccinations. On the other hand, more than
50% of these highly contagious cases were not in-
volved or did not result in outbreaks.
The relative low number of outbreaks and the
limited number of cases in each patient cluster may
primarily be attributed to factors such as:
— a high percentage of immune passengers and
crew;
— readily available medical care for new passengers
and crew members on board, with heightened
awareness to report fever and rash;
— an active screening and identification program
and a strict isolation policy for symptomatic pa-
tients, and
— an active screening, identification, immunization,
and follow-up program for close contacts.
In temperate climates, most varicella cases oc-
cur before the age of 10, with near-universal sero-
conversion by late childhood [6]. The epidemiology
is less well understood in tropical areas, where a re-
latively large proportion of adults in some countries
are seronegative [6]. In the present study, most cruise
passengers were born in the United States before
1980 and therefore were considered immune [7].
Since the introduction of varicella vaccine in 1995,
the incidence of varicella in USA has decreased as
vaccination coverage has increased. Nevertheless,
varicella outbreaks continue to occur, even among
populations with high vaccination coverage [8]. Vari-
cella vaccine is routinely used to vaccinate healthy
children only in some countries, including the Uni-
ted States, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the Domi-
nican Republic, Germany, Mexico, Qatar, Spain, South
Korea, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and
Uruguay [7].
No passenger was the likely index case in any of
the 8 outbreaks. The majority of varicella patients
(81%) were crew members, and the typical index case
was a crew member from a sub-tropical or tropical
country who had signed on the ship less than 21
days before presenting with a typical skin rash. In
6 of the clusters all cases seemed interconnected with
intervals of less than one incubation period between
two presentations. However, in Cluster # 3, which
appeared to last 4.5 months, there were 2 gaps lon-
ger than one incubation period and 1 gap slightly lon-
ger than two incubation periods between cases, and
in Cluster # 4 there was a 27-day gap between the
4th and the 5th patients, suggesting new index cases
or unreported missing links.
Since turnover of passengers and crew was high,
a new varicella case presenting more (or even less)
than 21 days after the last one might just as well
represent a new index case from ashore. However,
there are also several explanations for possible mis-
sing links: contagious patients may have left the ship
before the rash appeared or without reporting it, the
rash could have been misdiagnosed, fear of isola-
tion may have scared patients from reporting, or the
symptoms could have been so mild that the patient
was not bothered enough to report. Varicella vac-
cine is 70–90% effective in preventing all varicella,
but modified varicella infections (breakthrough) can
occur in vaccinated people [2]. The rash is then of-
ten atypical (mostly maculopapular lesions with less
than 50 vesicles), and fever is less common or of
shorter duration. Although less infectious than vari-
cella in unvaccinated people, breakthrough varicel-
la cases should still be isolated for as long as lesions
persist [1]. In the present study, breakthrough vari-
cella was not diagnosed, but cases which were not
reported roaming the ships during the > 21-day gaps
between reported patients could represent conta-
gious missing links within 2 of the clusters (Cluster
# 3 and # 4). This possible phenomenon has con-
tributed to cruise line policies extending control mea-
sures to 2 incubation periods (42 days) after the last
varicella case.
Most crew members came from developing coun-
tries, some of which have low immunization rates. In
an Indian study, antibody testing showed that 26%
of 78 nursing and medical students were found to
be susceptible to varicella [9]. Serological testing re-
vealed that 17% of 121 Indian seafarers heading to
cruise ships were susceptible to varicella, while the
remainder might have had varicella or been vacci-
nated, but their recollection was uncertain [10]. In
a report from two cruise ships in Hamburg, 1 Filipino
and 2 Indonesian crew members had varicella [11].
Also in the present study Filipino, Indian, and Indo-
nesian crew members were among the most frequent-
ly reported nationalities with varicella. But these na-
Int Marit Health 2011; 62, 4: 209–290
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tionalities were also among those with the highest
number of seagoing employees. However, a dispro-
portionately high number of varicella cases (8%)
came from St. Vincent and the Grenadines, a small,
densely populated Caribbean island nation of about
104,000 inhabitants, which supplied 2.5% of the
crew. In contrast, 4.2% of the crew members but
none of the varicella cases among the crew were US
citizens.
The 187 varicella cases led to 2,685 contact vac-
cinations, and more than US$ 280,000 in direct vac-
cination costs. The number of vaccinated contacts
and the direct vaccination costs show that varicella
on cruise ships is time consuming and expensive.
Further, these figures only represent ‘the tip of the
iceberg’ regarding the actual time expended and
work performed by the medical teams and other staff
aboard. This is evident from the fleet protocol for
varicella management (Table 1). While indirect costs
(loss of productivity, interruption of crew transfers,
etc.) were not recorded, they were clearly conside-
rable. Logistically demanding, time-consuming, and
costly measures are estimating the need, ordering,
obtaining, and transporting vaccines all over the
world to ships that are often at sea for days between
ports. An additional challenge is the fact that the
vaccine should be administered in 2 doses 4–8
weeks apart. The second dose is often due after most
passengers and many crew members have left the
vessel.
Major cruise lines now require proof of immunity
of measles, mumps, and rubella (antibodies or MMR
vaccination) before hiring and some have added
proof of varicella immunity as well. The CDC recom-
mends that cruise ship passengers should be current
on routine vaccinations before travel, and crew mem-
bers should have documented proof of immunity to
vaccine-preventable diseases [7]. Idnani suggests that
testing for varicella IgG and IgM antibodies, followed
by vaccination when necessary, is a ‘cost-effective
method to prevent an expensive outbreak in the semi-
closed setting of a cruise ship’ and recommends this
as a mandatory part of the pre-employment medical
examination for Indian seafarers [10].
Our results suggest that it makes as much or
even more sense to require these measures for se-
lected other nations, too. The percentage of varicella
cases from one small island nation was much higher
than expected, also when considering the relatively
high number of seafarers hired from there. The cruise
industry is clearly a major local employer, and easy
solutions like an employment ban for seafarers from
some small countries might have national economic
and political consequences. Then again, the threat
of an employment ban might be a powerful incentive
for smaller nations to improve their general immuni-
zation situation. Hence, a sensible starting point might
be to demand pre-sea proof of immunity for seafa-
rers from nations with a disproportionately high per-
centage of varicella-susceptible adults.
Would it be a cost-effective way to reduce the
risk of varicella outbreaks on cruise ships to demand
pre-contract testing of all seafarers without evidence
of immunity and subsequent vaccination of the sus-
ceptible ones? The present study is not designed to
answer that question, but it gives some ideas for
consideration. One hundred and fifty-one varicella
cases among the crew in two years seem like a lot,
and it was certainly expensive. But a corporation with
a steady on-board complement of 35,000 crew mem-
bers will need to obtain proof of immunization from
many more, considering crew vacations and high
crew turnover. Even if the economic burden of anti-
body testing and subsequent vaccination is placed
on the individual crew member, such a measure may
go against the spirit of the Maritime Labour Conven-
tion of 2006 [12], and there will still be high costs
for companies in connection with policy implementa-
tion, immunity control and documentation, follow-up,
revocation of job offers, rescheduling of contract
dates, and travel arrangements, etc.
At this time most seafarers do not carry evidence
of varicella immunity, but in preparation for manage-
ment of future outbreaks seafarers’ physicians and
medical examiners should, whenever such proof is
available, add such to the seafarer’s medical certifi-
cate.
In conclusion, all cruise vessels must expect to
encounter one or more varicella cases every few years
and be prepared to handle outbreaks. All cases must
be reported to public health authorities ashore, and
respective varicella management guidelines must be
followed. Hence, every shipboard varicella case must
be considered a potential index case and trigger
a number of time-consuming and expensive measures
to prevent or control outbreaks, including isolation
and mass vaccination. It is not clear whether man-
datory pre-contract evidence of varicella immunity
from all seafarers is a cost-effective way to reduce
the outbreak risk on cruise ships; but pre-contract
testing/vaccination of crew members who hold cer-
tain positions (medical staff, child care, spa person-
nel) and from sub-tropical and tropical areas with
uncertain or low immunity might be worth consider-
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ing. Seafarers with known varicella immunity should
be encouraged to obtain valid documentation and
always carry it while travelling.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors are indebted to Aksel Schreiner, Wil-
liam Sera, and Vincent Warger for their valuable in-
put during manuscript preparation.
The authors have not received any financial sup-
port or funding of any kind for this study. All have
worked or work for Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
REFERENCES
1. Slate D, Kornylo K. Guidance for cruise ships on the man-
agement of varicella (chickenpox). Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/page/guid-
ance-cruise-ships-varicella.htm (Accessed 20 December
2012).
2. Lopez AS, Marin M. Strategies for the control and investiga-
tion of varicella outbreaks 2008. Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention. http://www.cdc.gov/chickenpox/out-
breaks/control-investigation.html (Accessed 20 December
2011).
3. World Health Organization. Annex 8. International Health
Regulations 2005, 2nd edition http://www.who.int/ihr/en/
/(Accessed 28 July 2011).
4. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 42 Public Health,
Part 71 Foreign Quarantine http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/
/ text- idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div6&view=text&node=42:1.0.
1.6.59.1&idno=42 – (Accessed 28 July 2011).
5 . Nikolic N, Dahl E, Rooney R, DeBernardis C. Acute gas-
troenteritis at sea and outbreaks associated with cruis-
es. In: Ericsson CD, Dupont HL, Steffen R. Traveler’s
Diarrhea. 2nd edition. Chapter 14. BC Decker Inc, Hamil-
ton, Ontario 2008; 136–143.
6 . World Health Organization. Vaccine position papers — Va-
ricella (August 1998) http://www.who.int/immunization/
/documents/positionpapers/en/ (Accessed 20 July 2011).
7. Slaten DD, Mitruka K. Cruise ship travel. In: CDC 2012
Yellow Book — Chapter 6 http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yel-
lowbook/2012/chapter-6-conveyance-and-transportation-
issues/cruise-ship-travel.htm (Accessed 20 July 2011).
8 . Leung J, Lopez A, Averhoff F et al. Public health response to
varicella outbreaks — United States, 2003–2004. MMWR
Weekly 2006; 55: 993–995. http://www.cdc.gov//mmwr/
/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5536a3.htm (Accessed 02 August
2011).
9 . Singru SA, Tilak VW, Gandham N et al. Study of suscepti-
bility towards varicella by screening for the presence of
IgG antibodies among nursing and medical students of
a tertiary care teaching hospital in Pune, India. J Glob
Infect Dis 2011; 3: 37–41.
1 0 . Idnani N. Varicella among seafarers: a case study on
testing and vaccination as a cost-effective method of
prevention. Int Marit Health 2010; 61: 32–35.
1 1 . Schlaich C, Riemer T, Lamshöft M, Hagelstein J-G, Ol-
denburg M. Public health significance of chickenpox on
ships — conclusions drawn from a case series in the port
of Hamburg. Int Marit Health 2010; 61: 28–31.
1 2 . International Labour Conference. Maritime Labour Con-
vention, 2006. www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/.../wcms_090250.pdf
(Accessed 20 December 2011).
